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THE LAW OF ADOPTION: ANCIENT AND MODERN
LEO ALBERT HUARD*
I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT.
Adoption, however achieved, is essentially the factitious creation
of blood relationship between persons who are not so related. Its
ancient purpose was to prevent the extinction of a family.'
Sir Henry Maine tells us that adoption is one of the oldest and
most widely employed of legal fictions.2 Without it, he asserts, society
would scarcely have escaped its swaddling clothes.3 It commanded the
approval of the greater number of archaic societies4 and has proven
to be the most perdurable of all artificial relationships designed to
prolong the continuity of family existence.5
The family is the basic group of most primitive societies.6 Those who
were related by blood naturally gravitated to each other to form
this first ring of society's organization. In the same way successively
higher organizational units were also predicated on blood relation-
ship between the members, e.g., the house, the tribe and finally the
state.7 Not every early society was actually formed by descent from
the same ancestor but all those which achieved permanence were so
descended or were assumed to be.8 This assumption was nearly al-
ways false since everywhere men of alien descent were admitted into
families other than their own. The Greek states, Rome, the Teutonic
aristocracies, the Celtic clan associations, the Slavonic Russians and
Poles all practiced adoption.9
Primitive adoption had a deeply religious significance' ° and the
adoption was carried out by a solemn rite indicating thelk adoptee's
admission into a new worship" as well as into a new family. The
assimilation into the new religion cannot be separated from the arti-
ficial creation of the new blood tie.12 It is clear that the "duty of per-
petuating the domestic worship was the foundation of the law of adop-
* B.A., St. Anseim College; LL.B., Georgetown University; Member of the
Bar of the District of Columbia; Professor of Law, Georgetown University
Law Center; Faculty Adviser, The Georgetown Law Journal.
1. II KocouREK & WIGMORE, EVOLUTION or LAW, PRIMITIVE AND ANCIENT
LEGAL INSTITUTIONs 344 (1915).
2. Id. at 341, 344; MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 130 (10th ed. 1901).
3. Id. at 27, 130.
4. Id. at 194.
5. II KOCOUREK & WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 341.
6. MAINE, op cit. supra note 2, at 126.
7. Id. at 126-29.
8. Id. at 131.
9. Id. at 129-30.
10. II KOCOUREK & WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 344, 345.
11. Ibid.
12. Id. at 341-46.
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tion among the ancients."' 3 Adoption, as thus practiced, contemplated
complete severance of relationship between the adoptee and his
natural family and complete acceptance into the adopter's family.
Man's earliest codes of law contain references to adoption. We find
the following proposition stated in the Code of Hammurabi approxi-
mately 2,000 years14 before the birth of Christ:
If a man take a child in his name, adopt and rear him as a son, this
grown up son may not be demanded back.
If a man adopt a child as his son, and after he has taken him, he trans-
gresses against his foster-father; that adopted son shall return to the
house of his own father.15
Similar mention may be found in the Hindu Laws of Manu. This
code is variously dated at 200 B.C. and 100 A.D.,16 but there is general
agreement that the laws contained therein are of an earlier time-
possibly as early as 1,000 B.C.1
7
The Hebrews and the Egyptians knew it and an adoption may be
inferred from the biblical account of the episode between Moses and
the Pharaoh's daughter: "and she adopted him for a son, and called him
Moses, saying: Because I took him out of the water."' 8
It is in Rome, however, that adoption reached its widest acceptance
and it is of Roman adoption that we have the most elaborate ac-
counts. Cicero (106-43 B.C.) gives us a most interesting dissertation
on the nature and legal incidents of adoption in his day.
What, gentlemen, is the law relating to adoption? Clearly that the
adoption of children should be permissible to those who are no longer
capable of begetting children, and who, when they were in their prime,
put their capacity for parenthood to the test. What pleas, then, what
considerations of family, of credit, or of religion justify an adoption in
any individual case,-this is the question commonly asked by the
Pontifical College. Which of these was looked for in your case? A man
twenty years of age or even less adopts a senator. Is it because he
desires a child? But he is in a position to beget one. He has a wife;
he will still rear children by her; and the father by the act of adoption,
will disinherit his son. Again why should the religious traditions of the
Clodii be extinguished, so far as you can extinguish them?
The age of the adopting party was never inquired into, as it was in the
case of Gnaeus Aufldius and Marcus Pupius, who, as I recollect, in
extreme old age, respectively adopted Orestes and Piso, and these adop-
tions, as in countless other cases, were followed by the adopted party in-
heriting the name, the wealth, and the family rites of his adopter. You
13. Id. at 344.
14. I KOCOUREK & WIGMORE, EVOLUTION OF LAW, SouncEs OF ANCIENT AND
PRnvaTm LAw 387 (1915); 11 ENcyc. BRIT. 135 (1947).
15. I KOCOUREx, & WIGMORE, op cit. supra note 14, at 426.
16. Id. at 469; 14 ENCYC. BRIT. 830 (1947).
17. Id. at 387.
18. ExoDus 2:10 (Douay Version).
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are not a Fonteius, as you should be by rights, nor have you become
the heir of your father by adoption, nor have you entered upon the
rites of the family into which you have been adopted, to take the place
of the paternal rites you have resigned. So, with the subversion of
sacred rites, the pollution of families, of that which you have left as
well as of that which you have contaminated, and with the scouting of the
legally prescribed terms of wardship and inheritance among our citizens,
you have set nature at defiance, and have become the son of a man whose
father you might have been, on the score of your relative ages. ... I
assert that your adoption did not take place in accordance with pontifical
rules .... 19
Gaius (ca. 130 A.D.) apparently wrote of the practice since it is
prominently mentioned in the Institutes of Justinian (ca. 533 A.D.) 20
which were largely taken from the prior Commentarii of Gaius.
Roman adoption took two forms, adoption in the strict sense which
applied to children under the patria potestas and adrogation which ap-
plied to persons sui juris.&2 1 Adrogation was the more ancient form and
each case required the enactment of a specific law by the Comitia
curiata2 2 The adoption of Clodius against which Cicero so vigorously
inveighs is a case of adrogation.
Perhaps we should pause here to note two very significant elements
of early adoption. First, it must be observed that the primary pur-
pose of adoption is the continuity of the adopter's family-there is
here no visible concern for the "best interests" of the adoptee. His
welfare seems almost irrelevant. Second is the religious emphasis
which lies at the very foundation of the practice. The adoptee is
cut off from the religion of his natural family and assumes the re-
ligion of the adopting family. Again, the sole concern is the adopter's
religion without reference to the adoptee's prior beliefs. Since primi-
tive adoption was a point of severahce for all other relationships be-
tween the adoptee and his natural family, this treatment of religion
was commendably logical. Both of these elements are now treated
far differently in modern American adoption law.
Our jurisprudence was largely acquired by inheritance from Eng-
land. The English had an inordinately high regard for blood lineage
and consequently the practice of adoption never acquired a foothold
there. The primitive understanding of adoption required the adoptee
to become a member of the adopter's family, to acquire a quasi-
interest in the adopter's property while the latter lived and to succeed
to such property upon the adopter's death. But to the English, heirs
19. WATTS, CICERO, THE SPEEcHEs, DE DOMO SUA, XIII, XIV (Loeb ed.,
1923).
20. MOYLE, IMPERATORIS IUSTIaANI INSTITUTIONES 137-41 (5th ed. 1912);
HUNTER, ROMAN LAW 203-21 (4th ed. 1903).
21. I COLQUHUON, A SUMMARY OF THE ROMAN CI= LAW § 688 (1849).
22. Ibid. See generally, §§ 683-716 for an elaborate account of the Roman
practice. A fine summary of the world history of adoption may be found in,
Brosnan, The Law of Adoption, 22 COLUM. L. REv. 332 (1922).
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meant legitimate children who were heirs of the blood.23 This was
an unalterable maxim which early became a fixed part of the law of
the realm: ".. . he is only heire which succeedeth by right of blood."
24
There was, therefore, no English law of adoption. Foster paternity,
however, was not unknown. Strangers were accepted into English
families and treated as if they were natural children. This relationship
was not formalized by any legal procedure and foster-children had no
separate legal recognition. They were not heirs of the blood and thus
could not inherit from the foster-parent.25 Adoption in the Roman
sense of the term was not legally possible in England until the Adop-
tion of Children Act of 1926.26
It is possible to speculate, however, that, upon occasion, the
English courts felt the need for a true adoption practice. At such
times, the courts were wont to give an extraordinary effect to the
presumption that a child born to a married woman was the legitimate
child of her husband. An eminent pair of legal historians relate
the remarkable instance of a child born to a married woman whose
husband had been "beyond seas" for nearly three years-remarkable
we say, because the child was reportedly held to be legitimate.27
The poignant story of Grace of Saleby falls in this category also.
The harrowing misadventures of this unfortunate maiden could only
be surpassed by those who create the melodrama for today's morning
television programs. Limitations of space and time prevent the
presentation of her tale of woe in this paper. It must suffice, there-
fore, to say that Grace was treated as the legitimate issue of Thomas
of Saleby et ux., even though it was quite clear that she was neither
his child nor his wife's.29 Occasions such as these led the great Bracton
to state:
But spurious offspring, which are procreated of a condemned marriage
by those, between whom matrimony cannot take place, are excluded
from all benefit. But they are legitimated sometimes, as it were by adop-
tion and with the consent and goodwill of the relatives, as if any one's wife
has conceived by another man than by her husband, and although this
is ascertained in truth, if the husband has taken the child into his house
and has avowed and nourished it as his son, he will be his heir and
legitimate, or if he has not expressly avowed him, provided he has not
sent him away . . . such a child will be adjudged to be the heir and to
be legitimate . . . provided it may be presumed, that he could have
23. I Co. LITT. 7b (First American ed. 1853).
24. II Co. LITT. 237b (First American ed. 1853).
25. As to the Roman use of wills to prevent descent from being wholly
interrupted, see MAINE, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 193-94; HANNAN, THE CANON
LAW OF WILLS 19 et seq. (1934).
26. 16 & 17 GEO. 5, c. 29; 17 HALSBURY, LAws OF ENGLAND §§ 1406-23 (2d ed.
1935).
27. II POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 398 (2d ed.
1911).
28. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 27, at 391-92, 398-99.
29. Id. at 398-99.
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begotten him. And the same thing may be said of a suppositious off-
spring, and so sometimes a common opinion is preferred to the truth.30
One wonders if the fiction thus erected atop the presumption of
legitimacy is socially preferable to the great fiction embraced in true
adoption. It seems certain that in the cases cited the result was the
same as if the child had in fact been adopted in the sense of that term
in Roman civil law. This use of the presumption of legitimacy might
also serve to explain some strange cases in our own reports. Grace
of Saleby has almost certainly had a counterpart in the United States.
Despite these ingenious instances of devious circumvention of
the law, it remains true that the English common law did not know
true adoption. This absence of common-law precedent undoubtedly
inhibited the initiation of the practice of adoption in this country.
On the other hand, once the initial step was taken and adoption was
decided upon, our legislatures were free to borrow from the other
systems in forming their own policy and our courts were bound only
by the terms of each particular legislative enactment.
One influence on United States adoption law can be traced to the
Spanish and French law which acquired a firm and lasting pied-&-terre
in Louisiana and Texas. French and Spanish jurisprudence was largely
modeled on Roman civil law and adoption was a well established prac-
tice in those countries.
It is not surprising, therefore, to find cases of Roman-style adoption
in the early volumes of the Louisiana and Texas case reports, long
before the practice had been generally sanctioned elsewhere in the
United States.
Typical instances may be found in the cases of: Fuselier v. Masse,
31
-an adoption by notarial act which failed because of improper pro-
cedure; Vidal v. Commagre,3 ---an adoption by special act of the
Louisiana legislature wherein the word adoption was held to be de-
rived from the Roman law, i.e, the adoptee became the child and
heir of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child; and Teal
v. Sevier,3-wherein the adoption failed since the Spanish law then
in force forbade an adopter who already had a legitimate child from
adopting a stranger as co-heir with such child. This holding of the
last named case is an interesting commentary on one of Cicero's ob-
jections to Clodius' adoption quoted earlier in this paper from the
oration De Domo Sua.34
The doctrine of stare decisis and the well-known resistance of com-
mon law courts to innovations of any kind probably combined with
30. I BRACToN, DE LEGIBUS !AIr.LAE f.63b, p. 503 (Twiss ed. 1878). (Emphasis
added.)
31. 4 La. 423 (1832).
32. 13 La. Ann. 516 (1858).
33. 26 Tex. 516, 521 (1863).
34. See note 19, supra, and accompanying text.
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other factors to prevent neighboring state tribunals from imitating
the practice of Louisiana and Texas. Whatever the reason, adoption
did not arise anywhere else in this country absent statutory authority.
However, we can again follow an interesting by-path which might,
under different circumstances, have been used as a precedent by our
state courts. It is recorded in history that many American Indian
tribes practiced adoption. An unfortunately brief account of such a
practice among Indians in Pennsylvania has been noted in a sister
review.35 The author tersely, and perhaps with tongue in cheek, de-
plores the fact that Pennsylvania courts have persisted in holding that
adoption was unknown to the common law.36 In the same spirit we can
surely add that no law can be considered more "common" than the
indigenous law of the country.
Ignoring these golden opportunities all our state courts (except
Louisiana and Texas) ruled that adoption was unknown to the com-
mon law37 and that they were, therefore, powerless to deal with
the matter. However, once the relationship was permitted by enabling
legislation, adoption was almost invariably held to make the adoptee
the child and heir of the adopter. The early cases38 usually contain
rather extensive references to Roman civil law and tacitly incorporate
the substantive effects of such law into their own new law of adoption.
In this roundabout way a very ancient practice finally acquired an
honorable estate in the new world.
The earliest adoption statute is variously reported to be that of
Mississippi in 184639 and Massachusetts in 1851.40 It seems clear that
Mississippi did permit adoption as early as 1846 and that such adop-
tion could make a stranger to the adopter's blood the heir of that
adopter.41 This affront to the pride of Massachusetts should be some-
what assuaged by the fact that the Massachusetts law of 1851 seems
to have been more complete.42
The true genesis of our adoption laws, whatever their exact vintage,
seems to lie in the increasing concern for the welfare of neglected
and dependent children which became apparent at many points
35. Hutton, Concerning Adoption and Adopted Persons as Heirs in Penn-
sylvania, 42 DICK. L. REV. 12, 13-15 (1937). But see, Non-She-Po v. Wa-Win-Ta
37 Ore. 213, 62 Pac. 15 (1900), where Indian customary adoption was ignored
because of the common-law policy against adoption.
36. Hutton, supra note 35, at 15.
37. Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243, 262 (1878); Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo.
456, 461, 98 S.W. 585, 586 (1906); and Woodward's Appeal, 81 Conn. 152, 162
(1908), are generally considered classic examples.
38. Ross v. Ross, Hockaday v. Lynn, Woodward's Appeal, supra note 37.
39. McFarlane, The Mississippi Law on Adoptions, 10 Miss. L.J. 239, 240
(1938); Woodward's Appeal, supra note 37, at 162, where the statute is not
specifically identified.
40. Ross v. Ross, supra note 37, at 262; Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession
By and From the Adopted Child, 28 WAsH. U.L.Q. 221, 222-23 (1943).
41. McFarlane, supra note 39, at 240.
42. Ross v. Ross, supra note 37, at 262-63.
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in this country beginning about 1849. 43 Our statutes, therefore; took
an immediate and radical departure from a basic concept of the
Roman law in that the primary concern of our laws was the welfare
of the child rather than concern for the continuity of the adopter's
family."
The "best interests" formula has consistently been honored by our
courts and is a uniquely American contribution to the law of adoption.
This characteristic of our law has also become the focal point of
one of the most troublous problems of modern day American adoption
practice, i.e., religion in adoption.
H. THE STATE OF AMERICAN ADOPTION LAW GENERALLY.
In spite of the somewhat eccentric history which we have outlined
above, adoption law in the United States has been characterized by
a steady development of its original purpose. Legislation and cases
both show a firm and continued devotion to the best interests of
the adoptee. In the more than a century since 1850 there has been
a consistent over-all improvement in the manner in which the law
has treated adoption. There has also been a parallel growth in the
popularity of adoption and the respect in which the institution is
held by society.
45
Writing in 1935, Chester G. Vernier stated that the most important
development in adoption law was the fact that an increasing number
of jurisdictions required a thorough investigation before placing a
child for adoption." Also, greater supervision of the adopter-adoptee
relationship was then becoming apparent in numerous statutory pro-
visions for trial periods before the adoption became final.47 Happily
both trends have continued.
Then, as now, the adoption of illegitimate, abandoned, dependent
and neglected children was a most troublesome social problem."
Today an imposing array of community services are vigorously co-
operating to erase this problem and have already succeeded in min-
imizing it to a considerable degree.49 Although the problem is not
solved, it is, at least, well-in-hand. Perhaps more important problems
to social workers today are the black market-gray market in adoptions
and the finding of adopters for "hard-to-place" children.50
The legal, as distinguished, from the social aspect of adoption has
43. Kuhlmann, supra note 40, at 223-24.
44. Ibid.
45. U.S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION. & WELFARE,
PROTECTING CHILDREN IN ADOPTION, REPORT OF A CONFERENCE, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
5. (June 27, 28, 1955).
46. 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 279-80 (1936).
47. 4 id. at 280.
48. Ibid.
49. See generally, PROTECTING CHILDREN IN ADOPTION, op. Cit. supra note 45.
50. PROTECTION OF CHILDREN IN ADOPTION, op. cit. supra note 45, at 5, 17-18.
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been the subject of an astonishing amount of research and writing.5
Most of the articles have been localized, i.e., they deal with the
adoption law of a particular state. However, since our adoption laws
are all based on the "best interests" formula, these articles have proved
useful outside the self-imposed geographical limitations of their
authors. Examination of these writings reveals a gratifying similarity
in the law from state to state. Particular procedures may differ but
the general approach remains fairly constant. We find, also that a
great many of the legal uncertainties of adoption law have now been
resolved quite satisfactorily.
The questions of who may adopt and who may be adopted, when the
consent of the child is necessary and when the consent of others may
be necessary, have been litigated and settled in most jurisdictions. The
effect of adoption and the problem of inheritance by and from
the adopted child are, in most places, no longer subject to doubt.
The disposition of these and other questions has been attended with
a ,surprising degree of uniformity from state to state.5 2
The scope of this paper precludes a close analysis of the many
similarities and the few differences in the adoption law of all the
jurisdictions under the flag of the United States. In any event,
Vernier's work, although it dates back to 1935, affords a complete
comparison which remains essentially valid to this day.53 In lieu,
therefore, of a comparative statutory analysis which would necessarily
suffer from over-condensation, we will discuss with some particularity,
the substantive provisions of a single modern statute thought to be
typical of today's enlightened legislation.
51. Here is an incomplete list of articles which have attracted the attention
of the author. Hutton, Concerning Adoption and Adopted Persons as Heirs
in Pennsylvania, 42 DICK. L. REv. 12 (1937); Limbaugh, The Adoption of
Children in Missouri, 2 Mo. L. REv. 300 (1937); McFarlane, The Mississippi
Law on Adoptions, 10 MIss. L.J. 239 (1938); Note, Powell, Adoption, Agree-
ment to Adopt, Agreement to Leave Property, Enforceability by Child, 17
TEXAS L. REV. 339 (1939); Kuhlmann, Interstate Succession By and From the
Adopted Child, 28 WAsn. U.L.Q. 221 (1943); Strahorn, Adoption in Maryland,
7 AID. L. REV. 275 (1943); Bugea, Adoption in Louisiana-Its Past, Present,
Future, 3 LovoLA L. REV. 1 (1945); Zacharias, Judicial Review of Adoption De-
crees, 23 Cnn-KENT L. REV. 233 (1945); Silberman, Adoption in New Jersey-
An Analysis of Its Legal Effects and Consequences, 1 RUTGERS L. REV. 250
(1947); Bugea, Adoption in Louisiana-Its Past, Present, Future, 23 TUL. L.
REV. 38 (1948); Quarles, The Law of Adoption-A Legal Anomaly, 32 MARQ.
L. REV. 237 (1949); Haertle, Wisconsin Adoption Law and Procedure, 33
MARQ. L. REV. 37 (1949); Note, Ivordy, Adoption-Right of Inheritance in
Absence of Legal Adoption-Speciftc Performance of Contract to Adopt and
Other Remedies, 47 MIcH. L. REV. 962 (1949); Strahorn, Changes Made by the
New Adoption Law, 10 MD. L. REv. 20 (1949); Note, Merlin, The Tennessee Law
of Adoption, 3 VA~N. L. REV. 627 (1950); Miller, The Lawyer's Place in Adop-
tions, 21 TENN. L. REV. 630 (1951); Asch, A Critical Appraisal of Adoption in
New York State, 20 BROOKLYN L. REV. 27 (1953).
52. 4 VERNIER, AMERIcAN FAMLY LAWS 279-460 (1936). Some authorities
feel that much can still be done with respect to uniformity, particularly
procedural uniformity. Merrill & Merrill, Toward Uniformity in Adoption
Law, 40 IowA L. REv. 299 (1955).
53. Ibid..
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The laws of the District of Columbia are the product of the Congress
of the United States. As a result, the standard of legislative perform-
ance is usually, but not invariably, quite high. The local citizenry is
alert and very, very vocal-and, in matters pertaining to family law,
rather well-organized. This combination normally makes for sound
legislation and the 1954 District adoption law is no exception. The
purpose of the law is the threefold protection of:
(1) the adoptive child, from unnecessary separation from his natural
parents and from adoption by persons unfit to have such responsibility;
(2) the natural parents, from hurried and abrupt decisions to -give up
the child; and (3) the adopting parents, by providing them informa-
tion about the child and his background, and protecting them from sub-
sequent disturbance of their relationships with the child by natural
parents.5 4
Any person may petition-the court for adoption and any perison,
minor or adult, may be adopted (sections 16-211, 16-212). 'If the adop-
tee is a minor over fourteen years of age, a written statement of his
consent must accompany the petition. If, however, the prospective
adoptee is under fourteen, the statement of consent must be secured
from both of his parents if they are alive, and are,- or were, married.
If one of the parents is dead, consent must still be acquired from
the living parent. The statute also provides for consents in the cases,
of children born out of wedlock and children whose parents have
lost their parental rights through appropriate court action. An onmi-'
bus clause authorizes the District commissioner 5 5 to consent in any
situation not specifically provided for in the statute. Where a parent
has abandoned the child, or cannot be located, provision is made
to waive such parent's consent. And to make more certain that the
child's welfare is a paramount consideration, the court is authorized
to decree the adoption without the otherwise required consents, if it
finds after hearing, that such consents are being withheld contrary
to the best interests of the child. [section 16-213 (a), (b) and (d) ].
This is rather more elaborate than the average statutory consent pro-
visions.
Upon filing of a petition, an investigation must be undertaken
by the District commissioners or by a licensed child-placing agency.
In either instance, the investigation must include a thoroughgoing
54. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-208 (Supp. 1955). The entire law runs from.
§ 16-201 through § 16-225 of the 1955 supplement of the code. Citations to the
various sections will frequently be made parenthetically in the text. The
draftsmen of the District law .seem to have borrowed a great deal from
prior recommendations of the federal Children's Bureau. See, EssENMIALs OF
OPTION LAW-AND- PROCEDURE (Children's-Bureau Publication No. 331, 1949).
55. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-213 (b) (2) (g). (Supp. 1955). The District of Co-
lumbia is governed by a commission appointed by the President of the United
States with the advice and consent of the Senate. For the powers and duties
of the commissioners, see, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-201 et seq. (1951). --
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inquiry into the environment, antecedents and assets of the adoptee,
the home of the prospective adopter and all other circumstances and
conditions which might have a bearing on the desirability of adoption
in the particular case. When such investigation is completed, it
must be reported to the court with a recommendation that the petition
for adoption be granted or denied (section 16-216). The section ob-
viously contemplates that a very exhaustive investigation will be made.
A weakness may exist in the proviso for referral to the District com-
missioners for investigation. The commissioners, naturally, will not
and cannot conduct such investigations in person and there is no
guarantee in the statutory language that their agents will be com-
petent social workers. It seems likely, however, that the commissioners
will turn such investigation over to the Department of Public Wel-
fare5 6 which does have a staff competent to handle these matters. No
other course of action seems practicable.
After due consideration of the petition, the consents and such other
evidence as is available, the court may enter a final or interlocutory
decree of adoption. No final decree of adoption may be entered un-
less the adoptee shall have been living with the petitioner at least
six months. An interlocutory decree may then, however, be entered.
Such decree must, by its terms, become final on a day certain not
less than six months nor more than one year from the date of its entry.
Interlocutory decrees may be revoked for good cause shown at any
time before they become final and it is contemplated that a supervis-
ing agency will visit the adoptee during the period between entry and
finality (section 16-218). There is no statutory provision for the
annulment of a final decree and any attack on the validity of such
decree, because of jurisdictional or procedural defect, must be made
within one year of the decree's effective date (section 16-219).
All proceedings, records and papers with reference to adoption
are to be deemed confidential. Hearings are to be held in a sealed
courtroom with as little fanfare as possible (section 16-218). No
one may inspect the records and papers except upon order of the
court and "only then when the court is satisfied that the welfare
of the child will thereby be promoted or projected." (section 16-221).
The District statute is almost Roman in its insistence that the
adoptee be completely assimilated in the family of the adopter. A
complete severance of the adoptee's ties with his natural family is
effected.
A final decree of adoption shall establish the relationship of natural
parent and natural child between adoptor and adoptee for all purposes,
56. D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-102 (Supp. 1955). As indicated in the cited section
of the code, the old Board of Public Welfare has been reorganized pursuant
to Reorganization Orders No. 57 and 58; see appendix to Title I, D.C. CoDE
ANN., pp. 56,,60-61 (Supp. 1955)..
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including mutual rights of inheritance and succession -the same as if
adoptee was born to adoptor. Such adoptee shall take from, through, and
as a representative of his adoptive parent or parents in the same man-
ner as a child by birth, and upon the death of an adoptee intestate, his
property shall pass and be distributed in the same manner as if such
adoptee had been born to such adopting parent or parents in lawful
wedlock. All rights and duties including those of inheritance and
succession between the adoptee, his natural parents, their issue, collateral
relatives, and so forth, shall be cut off, except that in the event one of
the natural parents is the spouse of the adoptor, then the rights and
relations as between adoptee, such natural parent, and his parents and
collateral relatives, including mutual rights of inheritance and succession,
shall in nowise be altered.57 (Emphasis supplied.)
In this matter of inheritance between adopter-adoptee, adoptee-
natural parents and both sets of collateral relatives, adoption law
in the United States has shown some lack of uniformity. This has
been caused by the interplay of the adoption statutes and the gen-
eral provisions on descent and distribution. Generally speaking, thd
descent and distribution statutes are prior in time and are regarded as
controlling by the courts unless clearly and expressly modified by
the adoption laws.58 The quoted language from the District act is
clear and unambiguous. Our courts should have no difficulty in
giving it literal effect. The cut-off of the adoptee from his natural
parents is true to history and perfectly logical.59
United States adoption laws are generally of high caliber and .our
courts have brought a very high standard of judicial competence to
the interpretation of these laws and their application to concrete cases.
Much still needs to be done in particular localities but the national
picture is definitely encouraging.
III. RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND ADOPTION.
Few of us would question the desirability of considering the
child's spiritual welfare as an element of the "best interests" formula.
But, if spiritual elements are proper constituents of the formula, to
what extent is a temporal-judge competent to evaluate their impor-
tance? This conflict between the importance of spiritual welfare to
the best interests of a child and the fact that a secular system of law
lacks a suitable tribunal in which to try the matter has never been
clearly acknowledged in the United States. As a consequence, the
legal emphasis which should be placed on the religious beliefs of the
parties in proceedings for adoption, custody and guardianship re-
mains uncertain.
57. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-222(a) (Supp. 1955): (Emphasis added).
58. 4 VERNiER, op. cit. supra note 52, at 408-12, 416-51.
59. Professor Vernier was not-convinced that "complete substitution of in-
heritance rights from the natural to the adoptive family" was the wisest course.
4 id. at 412.
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There are two primary reasons which suggest that religious belief
should never be considered a proper issue in a civil court of the
'United States. The first is that most of our judges are by training
and education temperamentally unsuited and professionally unquali-
fied to assess disputed spiritual values. Our courts have no heritage
of ecclesiastical precedent to turn to for guidance. We have always
rejected the idea that they have fallen heir to the spiritual jurisdic-
tion of the English ecclesiastical courts. Our judges can only look
to their own individual religious beliefs for aid in deciding issues
which involve spiritual elements. Such frank reliance on personal
bias is foreign to our belief in an impartial judiciary.
The second, and perhaps, more fundamental reason lies in a
strongly developed national sense of the impropriety of submitting
religious belief to legislative or judicial determination. The over-
whelming majority of United States citizens, whatever their religious
:persuasion, want it that way. We have, from the birth of this nation
forward, insisted that our legislatures and our courts restrict their
operations to matters of temporal concern.
This does not mean that we are irreligious, antireligious or even
religiously neutral. On the contrary a numerical majority of Amer-
icans are adherents of an organized, established church. At this very
time, a revival of religion is sweeping the United States and the
world. In addition, the document which forms the cornerstone of
our Government shows a keen awareness of a higher law, a divine
law.60 It is perhaps because we so jealously guard our freedom to
worship as we please that we have so determinedly kept spiritual
matters free from entanglement with legislatures and the courts,
It should be noted that we are not here contending that a specific
constitutional limitation prohibits the evaluating of religious beliefs
in legislative assemblies or court proceedings. Our contention is
broader; it is simply that the spirit of our national life, our con-
stitutions and our laws militate against such evaluation. The mere
thought of legislative and judicial bodies weighing matters upon
which learned theologians cannot agree is an affront to this wide-
spread understanding.
Present Legislation.
Despite all this, some forty-three states have enacted laws which
make religious belief pertinent to the judicial determination of adop-
tion, custody and guardianship.6 ' In general, these statutes provide
60. The Declaration of Independence, July 19, 1776, speaks of the "Laws of
Nature and of Nature's God" and- of the "unalienable Rights" with which all
men "are endowed by their Creator." It is signed "with a firm reliance on
the protection of Divine Providence ......
61. Note, Religion as a Factor in Adoption, Guardianship and Custody, 54
COLum. L. Rv. 376, 396-403 (1954); Note, Religious Factors in Adoption, 28
IND. L. J. 401, 402 (1953).
[ VOL. 9
1956 ] LAW OF ADOPTION: ANCIENT AND.MODERN 755
that the adopter, custodian, or guardian be of the same religious be-
]ief as the" child whenever practichble..2 It is clear that these statutes
contemplate some evaluation of the religious beliefs of the parties
by the judge of the court in which the proceeding is filed. If
such a statute does not contemplate some unexpressed degree of
religion-evaluation it has no meaning at all.
It has been said that these statutes are legislative attempts to
prevent the otherwise inevitable intrusion of the judge's personal re-
ligious bias in cases where differences of religious belief exist among
those contesting for custody, or among the adopter, the adoptee and
the latter's natural parents. On other occasions, they have been de-
scribed as legislative findings that the temporal welfare of children
is best secured if they continue to be trained in the religion in which
they were previously reared. Perhaps the statutes constitute official
recognition that religion is an important factor in our culture and
civilization. On a less solid footing is the suggestion that these
statutes recognize the church as a separate personality independent
of the state.63
These elements are all significant but they do not necessarily
reflect the true genesis of the "religious-protection" laws. It might
well be concluded that they are hesitant expressions of an inchoate
legislative "feeling" that religious belief should not be excised from
the "best interests" formula. Having but one way to insure considera-
tion of this "feeling" by the courts, the legislature took that way and
enacted the "feeling" into law. In this view, the "religious-protection"
laws are merely directional signals indicating that religious belief,
as distinguished from nonbelief, is an element to be considered with
the many other elements which go to make up the "best interests"
of a child. This seems most consistent with the fact that Americans
are, and have long been, a God-loving people and, the equally
important fact, that Americans are very reluctant to allow the law
to intrude into their religious beliefs.
Judicial Interpretation.
Most courts have interpreted the statutes in the light of the thought
last expressed. They have usually refused to consider religious be-
lief as a controlling factor unless the temporal welfare of the child
was equally well secured by those competing for his custody or adop-
tion.64 The statutory directive tips the scale only when the temporal
62. Note, Religion as a Factor in Adoption, Guardianship and Custody, 54
CoLum. L. REv. 376, 396-403 (1954);- Note, Religious Factors in Adoption, 28
IND. L. J. 401, 402 (1953).
63. These suggested justifications may be found in Pfeffer, Religion in the
Upbringing of Children, 35 B.U.L. Rnv. 333, 374-75 (1955), and authorities
cited therein.
64. Pfeffer, supra note 63, at 373.
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interests are in balance.65 In all probability most courts would place
exactly the same emphasis on religious belief even without statutory
authority.
These decisions, although sound in principle, avoid the fundamental
controversy lying dormant within these statutes. A recent Massa-
chusetts case66 has brought this basic controversy into sharp focus.
The issues have been defined and debated, and the highest court
of Massachusetts has stated its position in the clearest possible terms.
We shall not here challenge the court's disposition of the constitu-
tional issues.67 We will concentrate on the merits and wisdom of "re-
ligious protection" by statutory or decisional law in the light of the
basic considerations set out earlier in this paper.
The Massachusetts statute involved in the case referred to reads in
pertinent part as follows:
In making orders for adoption, the judge when practicable must give
custody only to persons of the same religious faith as that of the child.
In the event that there is a dispute as to the religion of said child, its
religion shall be deemed to be that of its mother.
If the court, with due regard for the religion of the child, shall never-
theless grant the petition for adoption of a child proferred by a person
or persons of a religious faith or persuasion other than that of the
child, the court shall state the facts which impelled it to make such a
disposition and such statement shall be made part of the minutes of the
proceedings.68
Shortly after the passage of this law, the Goldmans, a Jewish
couple, petitioned to adopt a pair of illegitimate three-year old twins
who had been in their custody almost since birth. The natural mother
of the children consented to the adoptions, in writing, on the petitions.
She knew that the petitioners were Jewish and that the children
would be raised in the Jewish faith. The mother was nominally a
Catholic, at least she claimed to be a Catholic- and there was no
evidence of record that she claimed membership in any other faith.
It should be noted, however, that the children had not been baptized
as Catholics and that the consent given by the mother could not in
conscience be given by a Catholic.69 In addition, the natural mother
had secured a civil divorce from her husband, whom she had married
before a priest, and had cohabited with another.70 This whole course
65. E.g., Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 199-200, 80 N.E. 802, 804-805
(1907).
66. Petitions of Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954), cert, denied,
348 U.S. 942 (1955).
67. See Pfeffer, supra note 63, at 379-93. But see 43 GEORGETOWN L.J. 305
(1955).
68. MAss. ANN. LAws c. 210, § 5B (1955).
69. AYRiNHAc, MARRIAGE LEGISLATION IN THE N w CODE OF CANON LAW
293-95, 334-35 (Rev. Lydon ed. 1949); IV DAvis, MORAL AND PASTORAL THE-
OLOGY 70, 214-16, 231 (6th ed. 1949); II DAvis, MORAL AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY
72 et seq. (6th ed. 1949).
70. Petitions of Goldman, supra note 66, at 649, 121 N.E,2d at 844; Pfeffer,
supra note 63, at 382.
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of conduct is quite inconsistent with a sincere profession in the com-
munion of the Catholic Church and can be considered substantial evi-
dence of a virtual abandonment of Catholicism.
A guardian ad liter, appointed by the probate court, alleged that
the children's religion was in "dispute" and that consequently they
must be considered members of the mother's church. The probate
court accepted this allegation as true and denied the petition on the
ground of the dissimilarity between petitioners' religion and that
of the unbaptized adoptees'. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts
affirmed even though it found that the petitioners could provide for
-the best interests of the children in all other respects. 71
The opinion is open to technical criticism in that it appears to
treat the "when practicable" provision in a highly cavalier fashion.
It disposed of this proviso on the ground that many Catholic couples
had filed applications with the Catholic Charities Bureau to adopt
children of this "type."72 The record indicates, however, that none
of these applicants had ever seen the twins.
The court also ruled in passing, that, as to very young children,
the religious faith of such children is the religious faith of their
parents. Since the faith of the mother expressly controls in the
event of a dispute, this means that in adoption proceedings, very
young children are conclusively presumed to belong to the mother's
church. The effect of this interpretation of the statute is to sub-
ordinate the "best interests" of very young children to the natural
mother's nominal religion. 3 The language of the statute does not
require this interpretation, and, furthermore, the interpretation seems
out of harmony with the reasons which have heretofore been advanced
to justify this type of legislation.
The opinion is understandable only on the basis that the court
found itself in a dilemma of its own making. One horn of the dilemma
was formed by the decision that the children's religion was in dispute,
the other by the statutory direction that the natural mother's re-
ligion then controls. The only reasonable way out of this impasse
was by determining what the mother's religion actually was at the
time the petition was filed. To do this the court would have had to
be prepared to determine when a Catholic is no longer in good stand-
ing in his church-a serious matter even for a Catholic theologian, an
impossible matter for a layman, Catholic or non Catholic. The only
other way out-and an unreasonable way-was to hold that once
71. Petitions of Goldman, supra note 66, at 648-51, 121 N.E.2d at 844-45.
72. Petitions of Goldman, supra note 66, at 650, 121 N.E.2d at 844, 845;
Pfeffer, supra note 63, at 380.
73. Petitions of Goldman, supra note 66, at 652-53, 121 N.E.2d at 846; Pfeffer,
supra note 63, at 380, 381. The Massachusetts court has since affirmed that the
Massachusetts statute binds the court to give controlling effect to-identity-of
religious faith when practicable. Ellis v. McCoy, 124 N.E.2d 266, 268 (Mass.
1955).
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a Catholic; always a Catholic, a proposition that the Catholic Church
itself would not accept without reservation. Nevertheless the court, in
effect, so decided. This emphasis on religion by a secular court is dis-
tinctly improper and out of place. However, as long as religious pro-
,tection statutes are couched in terms similar to the Massachusetts law,
results such as this will remain possible.
The Catholic Position Analyzed.
Some Catholics have applauded the Massachusetts statute and its
application. This has created an unwarranted impression that Catholic
belief requires all Catholics to support such laws and decisions.
Nothing could be further from the truth; each Catholic is free to
,question the wisdom and propriety of these laws as so interpreted.
Basically, a Catholic believes that his religion is the only right
religion. The Catholic Church is the custodian of the law of God
and obedience to that law is the only path to eternal salvation. It
is mandatory, therefore, for a Catholic to seek to promote identity
between this divine moral law and the secular law. Every Catholic
citizen of the United States must use all lawful means at his disposal
to make the secular law correspond to the divine law. The emphasis,
of course, is on lawful means. The Catholic Church does not en-
courage revolution or subversion of our constitutional form of gov-
ernment. Its members, like all other citizens of the United States,
arelimited to registering their preferences and objections by voting,
by running for public office and by petitioning the legislature.
Catholicism also imposes definite demands on Catholic parents.
The United States Catholic will maintain that every Catholic has a
moral obligation to insure the Catholic upbringing of his children.
Each individual Catholic will insist on his right to this measure of
control over his children and will resist, with all the strength at his
command, any attempt to take this right from him.
These are fundamental premises to which all United States Catholics
readily subscribe. However, our Catholics differ sharply among them-
selves as to the proper manner of promoting a better understanding
of the law of God and of encouraging its incorporation into secular
law. We note, in passing, the existence of two schools of thought.74
The first of these takes a position which, in lay language, can be
described as traditional or classical. It is beautifully simple and
easily stated: The State has the obligation to recognize the Catholic
Church as the true religion and to legislate in the light of Catholic
teaching. Secular laws, and their judicial interpretations, are thus
per se desirable if they foster an immediate advance of the Catholic
faith.
74. See generally, Weigel, The Church and the Democratic State, 27 THOUGHT
165 (1952).
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The second school approaches the problem of Church-State relations
in a significantly different manner. They first deny any obligation to
change the American democratic system. They do not seek the aid
of thb ldw to advance Catholic teaching; they ask only that the law
does not hinder them. In the United States the law and national
policy unite to guarantee freedom to worship without hindrance.
In this religiously pluralistic atmosphere, the Catholic Church has
flourished and the long-range good of the Church demands that this
status be preserved.
It is submitted that both schools of thought should object to the
religious protection laws discussed herein. It has perhaps not been
sufficiently noticed by Catholics that these measures may be two-edged
swords. If, for example, under the facts of the Goodman case, the
status of the parties had been different, all Catholics might well have
united in opposing the law and the decision. Suppose the prospective
adopters were Catholic, the children were baptized, the father a
Catholic and the mother a non-Catholic, then even though she were to
give consent to adoption by the Catholic adopters, the Goodman rule
would call for denial of the petition and placement of the children
with a non-Catholic agency. The children would thus be deprived
of their Catholic heritage and training. This possibility should al-
ways be borne in mind when evaluating the religious protection
statutes.
Earlier in this paper, we pointed out that most people would agree
that the child's spiritual welfare is a part of his "best interests." Since
this is so the law must take account of it. This the law could do in
adoption, custody, and guardianship proceedings by requiring: (a) that
the religion of all parties be ascertained; (b) that the natural parents
be apprised that their" consent to the adoption, custody or guardian-
ship is necessary, if they have not already been deprived of their
parental control by operation of law; (c) that like consent be se-
cured from the child himself, if he has personally become a member
of a particular faith and is of an age to understand and appreciate
the basic tenets of that faith, e.g., ten, twelve or fourteen years of age.
The legal procedures would then be freed from the binding effect
of the Goodman case, and, under law, neither opposition nor en-
couragement would be manifested toward the particular religion of
any party. The secular court would then be at liberty-as it should
be in a country where religious pluralism is the rule-to give the re-;
ligion of all the parties the weight it deserves in determining the best
interests of the adopteeJ5 In such a society no legislative act should
75. In the 1954 District of Columbia statute, discussed earlier in this paper,
the matter of religious belief is drawn to the attention of the court by a re-
quirement that the petition for adoption state the religion of the adoptee or
his natural parents -and the religion of the petitioner. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-214
(Supp. 1955). This would seem to be sufficient.
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ever bind a court of law to give the religion of any party conclusive
effect. And it should not be possible for a court of law to treat the
religion of any party in such a manner. This we understand to be
consonant with intelligent Catholicism and sound citizenship in the
pluralistic society of these United States. If this allows the religious
.bias of individual judges to enter into their deliberations-so be it!
This is the lesser of two evils and it can be cured by selecting better
judges.
While avoiding the danger should the Goodman rule operate against
him, the Catholic citizen can, under the statutory scheme suggested
above, fulfill his moral obligation easily through the use of private
agencies. Since there are a great many Catholic adoption agencies
which will place Catholic children only in Catholic homes, the Catho-
lic citizen would thus be able to take advantage of legal procedures for
adoption without compromising his religion and without advocating a
"religious protection" law.
Indeed, in adoption cases, and to a somewhat lesser extent in custody
and guardianship cases, the problem of religious belief is more properly
considered and disposed of at the placement level. Public and private
placement agencies should seek to place children in families of the
same religious belief as their natural parents. Catholic placement
agencies are bound by Catholic belief to place Catholic children with
Catholic families.76 The evidence is that secular and non-Catholic
agencies usually try to place children in families of the same religious
belief as the natural parents.77 A law requiring the court to ascertain
the religion of the parties and to obtain the consents of the natural
parents and the child, as outlined above, is the maximum protection
to which any religion is entitled under the law of the United States.
It is also the wisest course to follow since it minimizes the evaluation
of religious belief which has proven to be such an impossible and un-
pleasant task for our civil courts.
IV. MISCELLANY AN CONCLUSION.
Among the ancient Greeks, a symposium was a convivial meeting
for drinking, conversation and intellectual entertainment. Unfortu-
nately, symposia of this kind are now largely extinct and those which
survive are restricted to greek letter fraternities and similar organiza-
tions. One wishes with the wistfulness of advancing years, that this
76. See note 69, supra, and accompanying text. It should be noted that
there is no Catholic Canon Law of adoption. The Canons (1059, 1080) refer
to adoption only with respect to the fact that it can. be an impediment to valid
marriage. AYRNHAc, MARRIAGE LEGISLATION IN THE NEW CODE OF CANON LAW
97, 188 (Rev. Lydon ed. 1949); IV DAvIs, MORAL, AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY 114,
166 (6th ed. 1949).
77. Note, Religious Factors in Adoption, 28 IND. L.J. 401, 402-05 (1953). See
particularly the communications quoted in footnotes 9, 24-27 inclusive of this
Note.
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were not so! However, this symposium -is of the more prosaic, modern
kind-a collection of articles on a single topic; in this case, the law of
the family.
Our particular segment of this broad subject has been the law of
adoption. As we have indicated before, much has been written, and
well written, concerning the many diverse phases of adoption law78 -
We have sought, therefore, to present general observations concerning
the origins, development and present status of that body of law. We
have singled out, and discussed at some length, what seemed to us
to be a legal problem of present importance. These we conceive to
be the purposes of a symposiac article. No conversation, no drink-
ing, only a deplorable paucity of intellectual entertainment is the
ascetic fare of today's symposia!
There remains but little time or space for discursive comment upon
quasi-legal matters. One such matter, inseparably fused to the purely
legal side of adoption must, however, be noticed. This is the wide-
spread traffic in infants commonly called the black market and gray
market in adoptions7 9
We know that there are upwards of 90,000 petitions8 for adoption
filed in the United States each year. We also know that there are ap-
proximately 150,000 children born out of wedlock each year.
81 Of
all the petitions filed perhaps fifty per cent seek the adoption of chil-
dren born out of wedlock.P This leaves approximately 100,000 ille-
gitimate children whose adoption has not been sought through legal
channels. The great majority of these children probably remain with
their parents or find their way into the families of relatives and are
informally absorbed there. Many others are taken into orphanages
or foundling homes and some of these eventually become adoption
statistics. The evidence is that unknown thousands of children are
sold each year to persons eager to have children in their families.
No one knows how well these irregular adoptions work or, con-
versely, how much harm they do to society.
The problem is so grave that it has been the subject of congressional
78. The latest worthy compilation is an excellent symposium on the subject
of adoption alone. 40 IowA L. REV. 225-63 (1955).
79. This has commanded a great deal of attention in the popular press; see,
e.g., Eliot, Black Market Adoptions Place Risk on Babies, The Sunday Star,
(Washington, D.C.), Dec. 4, 1955, p. E-9, col. 1; David, Babies for Sale, The
American Weekly, April 1, 1956, p. 6. Better annotated and generally more
temperate comment can also be found in at least one legal periodical. Note,
Moppets on the Market: The Problem of Unregulated Adoptions, 59 YALE
L.J. 715 (1950).
80. Perlman and Wiener, Adoption of Children, 1953: A Statistical Analysis,
40 IowA L. REv. 336 (1955).
81. U.S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE,
PROTECTING CHILDREN IN ADOPTION, REPORT OF A CONFERENCE, WASHINGTON,
D.C., June 27 and 28, 1955 at p. 8.
82. Perlman and Wiener, supra note 80, at 341.
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investigation83 and has commanded the serious concern of the conferees
at a recent national conference on the protection of children.84 Cor-
rective measures seem to be headed in several directions simul-
taneously: (a) a federal law making it a federal offense to engage in
interstate commercial dealing in children; (b) education of the pro-
fessions which deal with some phase of adoption; (c) sharing of in-
formation among these professions; and, (d) extension of services
to unmarried mothers in each community.
There is general agreement that the last three measures in the
above list are desirable and that all three should be vigorously pushed.
The participants at the national conference, however, took a generally
unfavorable view of the enactment of a federal criminal law as a
cure for the black market. More efficient administration of state
laws was generally regarded as a more effective deterrent to this un-
savory practice.85 However, a federal bill of the kind objected to
is currently pending in this Congress.8
Statistical analysis also demonstrates that most adoptive children
born in wedlock come from homes broken by divorce, desertion or
separation.87 This suggests again the need for renewed intensification
of the search for better procedures, legal and social, to resolve prob-
lems of marital discord. Our continued failure to do this is a national
scandal which is daily becoming more dangerous to our society.
Throughout this paper we have noted that courts place the greatest
emphasis on the best interests of the child.88 Two major deviations
from this rule, are, however, occasionally apparent: one occurs when
a blood relative is seeking to adopt the child; and the other when
religion is involved. The latter we have discussed at considerable
length. The former merits some attention also.
Some courts have tended to scrutinize adoptions by blood relatives
of the adoptee less closely than adoptions by strangers. These tri-
bunals have seemingly been impressed by the clich6 that blood is
thicker than water and that prospective adopters are almost bound
to love an adoptee of their own blood. This is, of course, untrue and
life in the home of a cruel, or even, indifferent relative can be very
83. Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
84. PROTECTING CHmDREN IN ADOPTION, op. cit. supra note 81, at 8-16, 18-20,
36-37.
85. PROTECTING CHILDREN IN ADOPTION, op. cit. supra note 81, at 36-37. See
Note, Moppets on the Market, supra note 79, at 735-36.
86. S. 2281, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). The Bill makes commercial dealing
with minor children in interstate commerce a crime punishable by $10,000
fine or 5 years imprisonment, or both. An expanded version of this bill was
reintroduced in the second session on January 23, 1956. S. 3021, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1956).
87. Perlman and Wiener, supra note 80, at 342.
88. A more proper allocation of emphasis is shown in the new District
of Columbia statute which seeks to take into account the interests of adopter,
adoptee and natural parents. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-208 (Supp. 1955).
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miserable. It has been suggested that the character and personality
of the individual adopter must always be focused upon. Successful
adoptions are made when the adopter is prepared and able to offer
love and affection to the adoptee and the latter is prepared and
able to reciprocate. It is unrealistic to believe that relatives naturally
love each other. It is not even true that all parents love their children
or that all children love their parents. A stranger to the adoptee may
be able to offer him more affection than anyone else, and, conversely,
the adoptee may offer his affection to the stranger more readily than
to his natural parents or his blood relatives.89
This calls for a greater emphasis in all cases on the emotional ad-
justment between adopter and adoptee and less emphasis on purely
temporal welfare. It calls for close and skilled examination of the
motivations of the adopter and his emotional reaction to children
in general, and the adoptee in particular. The adopters will daily re-
flect the values of their society, their religion and the way they were
brought up. These will be the greatest influences on the develop-
ment of the child and will be the determining factors in the success
or failure of the adoption.90
There is little or nothing which can affirmatively be done in this
area by the enactment of a law. We noted, with respect to religion,
which is, in part, an emotional value, that statutory command may
sometimes be positively harmful. All that can be done is to urge the
judiciary to pay more heed to emotional values and to make in-
creased use of personnel, skilled in psychology in pre-adoption in-
vestigations.
We have taken great strides forward since the days of primitive
adoption. Future progress lies principally in increased community
responsibility, particularly with respect to the care and handling of
the unmarried mother. There are still deficiencies and lacunae in
the law of adoption but substantial improvement of adoption practice
can be achieved even with the law as it exists today. With an in-
crease in community responsibility, with a greater awareness of public
duty, whatever change is needed in the law will speedily follow.
89. Martire & McCandless, Psychological Aspects of the Adoption Process,
40 IowA L. REv. 350, 356 (1955).
90. See, Martire and McCandless, supra note 89, at 350-51.

